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Abstract
Research in multiagent systems is advancing and one can predict its future widespread implemen-
tation in real-world systems. One needs however to acknowledge that the agents evolving in the real
world have limited access to resources. They have to seek after resource objectives and compete for
those resources. We introduce a class of resource games where resources and preferences are described
with the language of a resource-sensitive logic. We study three decision problems, the first of which
is deciding whether an action profile is a Nash equilibrium. When dealing with resources, interesting
questions arise as to whether some equilibria can be eliminated or constructed by a central authority
by redistributing the available resources among the agents. In our economies, division of property in
divorce law exemplifies how a central authority can redistribute the resources of individuals, and why
they would desire to do so. We thus study two related decision problems: rational elimination and
rational construction. We consider them in the contexts of dichotomous or parsimonious preferences,
and of logics that admit or not the weakening rule. This permits us to offer a variety of algorithms and
complexity results that are applicable to a large number of settings.
1 Introduction
Research in multiagent systems is advancing and one can predict its future widespread implementation in
real-world systems. One needs however to acknowledge that the agents evolving in the real world have
limited access to resources. They have to seek after resource objectives and compete for those resources.
Accordingly, the research in the formal and computational aspects of resource-conscious agents is active
(e.g., [31, 20, 5, 9, 28, 1, 27]).
In this paper, we study games of resources that are aimed at representing the strategic interactions
between rational agents [17] where some combinations of resources replace the abstract notions of action
and preferences. In these games, players are endowed with some resources and have preferences upon
some resources to be available after the game is played. Players’ actions also consist in making available
some of the resources they are endowed with.
We propose a class of games of resources that exploits the formalisms and reasoning methods com-
ing from the literature in knowledge representation and computational logics, namely resource-sensitive
logics: e.g., Linear Logic, Separation Logic, BI Logic [8, 23, 16]. The languages of these logics allow
a fine-grained description of resources, processes, and their harmonious combinations. In computer sci-
ence, they have been quite successful at modeling systems for multi-party access and modification of
shared structures, by allocation and deallocation of resources. Not based on a trivial naı¨ve set theory and
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a trivial truth, the resources used in this paper will thus be supported with a rich logical language, and
elaborate reasoning features.
A resource is represented by one formula of a resource-sensitive logic LOG. More specifically, we
assume here that LOG is some propositional variant of Linear Logic. In fact, the technical aspects of the
paper can be grasped without a great understanding of Linear Logic. Nonetheless, we provide an informal
presentation of the resource interpretation of Linear Logic in Section 2. In addition, the interested reader
can see [20, 21] for an illustration of the modeling power of Linear Logic in social choice theory.
We will consider individual resource games defined formally in Section 3. Each player i of a game
will be endowed with a multiset of resources ǫi. An action for Player i will be to contribute a subset of
ǫi.
1 An (action) profile specifies a contribution for every players. An outcomewill be a context consisting
of a multiset of resources resulting from a profile. Then, each player i has a goal γi, which is a resource,
represented by one formula of LOG. An outcome X satisfies the goal of Player i if there is a proof of
X ⊢ γi in the logic LOG. This will mean that the resources in X can be consumed so as to produce γi.2
Intuitively, we can imagine a game taking place around a table. Each player has an objective
to create some resource. Each player has also a bag of resources. To play, each player
chooses to take some resources (possibly none) from their respective bags and put them on
the table in front of them. The outcome is the collection of resources on the table after every
player has chosen. A player is satisfied if we can transform the resources on the table so as
to produce her goal. It is a Nash equilibrium when no player has an incentive to take back
any resources she put on the table, or to add more resources from her bag.
What should be an incentive to take back or to add resources? We will study these games of resources two
kinds of preferences. We will first consider, in Section 4, preferences over outcomes that are dichotomous.
We can thus initially say that Player i prefers an outcomeX over an outcome Y iff X ⊢ γi and Y 6⊢ γi.
Some formal results will lead us to define in Section 5, parsimonious preferences, a finer notion of
preference where i may be qualitatively indifferent betweenX and Y , but still preferX over Y because
i’s contribution is strictly less inX than in Y .
We will study three decision problems defined also in Section 3, the first of which is deciding whether
an action profile is a Nash equilibrium. When dealing with resources, interesting questions arise as to
whether some equilibria can be eliminated or constructed by a central authority by redistributing the
available resources among the players [9]. In the tradition of social mechanism design, redistribution
schemes can be used by a central authority to enforce some behavior, either by disincentivizing a behav-
ior or incentivizing a behavior. Formal frameworks dealing with redistribution schemes and economic
policies have been studied [6, 13, 15].
Some profiles that are not equilibria can have desirable outcomes. Some equilibria can have outcomes
that are undesirable. Desirability must here be understood from the point of view of a system designer. A
system designer can redistribute the resources of the players in a game so as to steer the interaction to or
away from a particular outcome.
A redistribution consists in reallocating the resources endowed to the players. To every
redistribution corresponds a new game where the players maintain their objectives, but their
possible actions have changed. If Gǫ is the original game, and ǫ′ is a redistribution of the
endowment function ǫ, thenGǫ
′
is a new game.
1Individual resource games were called ideal resource games in [26] to reflect the fact that any subset of the endowments can be
used by the players.
2Indeed, X ⊢ γi indicates that the resources X are sufficient to produce γi, and X ⊢ γj indicates that the resources X are
sufficient to produce γj . It may be however that the resources X are not sufficient to produce γi and γj simultaneously.
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We will investigate how resource distribution schemes can contribute to eliminate undesirable game equi-
libria, and construct desirable game equilibria. They are a form of redistribution of wealth, which consists
in wealth being transferred from some individuals to others. In our economies, it exists in the form of
social mechanisms such as taxation, public services, and confiscation. Division of property and division
of debt in divorce law are good imagery of what a designer can do in the mechanisms we propose in this
paper. This toy example will be formalized later.
Example 1. Ann and Bernard have filed for divorce. Ann recently owns an alarm clock that she recently
bought. Bernard recently bought a breadmaker. He also owns enough flour to make bread for two year.
Ann likes homemade bread, and would like to be able to make her own bread for one year. Bernard wants
to keep the alarm clock. In this context, the outcome equilibrium is very likely to be the one where Ann
does not use the alarm clock and Bernard retains the breadmaker and the flour. Neither of them satisfy
their objective.
However, an arbitrator can redistribute their endowments. He can give the breadmaker and half the
flour to Ann, and give the alarm clock to Bernard. Doing so, the outcome where Ann and Bernard do not
use any of their endowment can be eliminated. Moreover, a new outcome equilibrium can be constructed
where both satisfy their objectives.
We will thus look at two decision problems related to Nash equilibria: rational elimination and ratio-
nal construction of Nash equilibria.
In a game Gǫ, a profile can be rationally eliminated from a game if there exists a redistribu-
tion ǫ′ of ǫ such that there is no profile with the same outcome which is a Nash equilibrium in
Gǫ
′
. A profile can be rationally constructed if there exists a redistribution ǫ′ such that there
is a profile in Gǫ
′
with the same outcome, which a Nash equilibrium.
Outline. We make an brief presentation of Linear Logic in Section 2. We explain how the language
can be used to capture a variety of resources which we will put to use in the remained of the paper.
We present individual resource games formally in Section 3. We also introduce the decision problems
NASH EQUILIBRIUM, RATIONAL ELIMINATION, andRATIONAL CONSTRUCTION. We will use
and study two kinds of preferences over action profiles. We define dichotomous preferences in Section 4.
We study all three decision problems. We propose general algorithms and general complexity results
depending on the complexity of sequent validity in LOG, and on whether LOG admits the weakening
rule or not (that is, whether LOG is linear or affine). We also illustrate the decision problems with a few
small examples. We do the same for parsimonious preferences in Section 6. In particular, we formalize
Example 1 in Section 6.2 and solve some problems for it. We briefly explain how individual resources
games can form a basis for defining cooperative resource games in Section 7. Some concluding remarks
are offered in Section 8.
We provide a technical appendix. Section A presents the sequent rules of Affine MALL. Section B
briefly summarizes some elements of computational complexity that can be useful to the reader.
2 Resources and Linear Logic
One contribution of this paper is to show that resource-sensitive logics are a useful tool for studying the
formal aspects of resources in game theoretical settings. Another contribution is to demonstrate that it is
possible to obtain rather general results for a large class of games of resources depending on the formal
properties of the logic LOG we start with. This offers the opportunity to tailor a game to the needs of a
certain application without changing the framework. We can indeed choose any sensible fragment of a
resource-sensitive logic.
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We will work with some fragments of Linear Logic [8]. The results of this paper will draw upon the
proof theory and its rules presented in the Appendix A, even though the technical aspects of the paper can
be grasped without a great understanding of the language. However, some intuitions about the resource
interpretation of Linear Logic can hopefully contribute to make reading through the remainder less dull.
2.1 Formulas and sequents
A good introduction to Linear Logic and its variants is [25]. We will use logics defined on the language
of propositional Linear Logic. The classical tautology splits into the additive ⊤ and the multiplicative 1.
The classical falsum splits into the additive 0 and the multiplicative ⊥. The additive conjunction and
disjunction are respectively & and ⊕. The multiplicative conjunction and disjunction are respectively `
and ⊗. The linear implication is A ⊸ B and combines with the multiplicative conjunction such that
(A⊗ (A⊸ B))⊸ B is a valid principle. The linear negation is ∼A.
MLL is the multiplicative fragment, whose language is formalized by the grammarA ::= 1|⊥|p| ∼A|
A ` A|A ⊗ A|A ⊸ A, where p is an atomic formula. It only contains the multiplicative connectives.
MALL is the fragment with both additive and multiplicative operatorsA ::= ⊤|0|1|⊥|p| ∼A|A`A|A⊗
A|A⊸ A|A&A|A⊕A.
We now introduce some terminology and notations. A sequent is a statement Γ ⊢ ∆ where Γ and
∆ are finite multisets of occurrences of formulas of LOG. Often, we can conveniently write a multiset
{A1, . . . , An} as the list of formulas A1, . . . , An. Also, we use the notation Γ∗ =
⊗
A∈ΓA and ∅
∗ = 1.
An intuitionistic sequent is a sequent Γ ⊢ A with only one formula to the right. Sequent provability will
play an important part in the technical work of the paper. A sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is provable in LOG if there
exists a linear proof using the rules of the logic LOG. Intuitively, Γ ⊢ ∆ being provable means that the
resources in Γ can be transformed into either of the resources in ∆. If a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is not provable,
we can write Γ 6⊢ ∆, although we will also often simply write “not Γ ⊢ ∆”.
In the individual resource games introduced in this paper, the action of a player i consists in making
available a multiset Ci of formulas/resources. The outcome of an action is the multiset union of all the
individual actions: Γ =
⊎
i Ci.
3 The goal of a player is a formula/resource γ. To decide whether the
profile with outcome Γ satisfies the goal γ of a player, we will evaluate the validity of the (intuitionistic)
sequent Γ ⊢ γ.
The logic captured by all the rules in the Appendix A is Affine MALL.
A rule that is not part of the calculus is the structural rule of contraction. One rule of contraction (left
contraction) says that if something can be proved with two occurrences of A, then it can be proved with
only one occurrence. Symbolically,
Γ, A,A ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
.
This is prohibited in every resource-sensitive logic. Integrating it into Linear Logic, one consequence
would be that A ⊢ A ⊗ A. If we interpret formulas as resources—as we do—contraction would be a
license to duplicate resources at will. (See [22] for a detailed account of logics without contraction.)
We must concede that some of the connectives of MLL and MALL do not have an intuitive interpre-
tation in terms of resources, in and of themselves. This is the case of the multiplicative and the additive
falsums (⊥, 0), and of the somehow infamous multiplicative disjunction `. Fortunately, we do not need
them to enjoy the full expressivity of Linear Logic. To see that, Table 1 shows how the connectives in-
teract. From it, it is clear that we can as well make without some language redundancy. The language of
MLL is
A ::= 1 | p | ∼A | A⊗A | A⊸ A ,
3We use
⊎
for the multiset union, and
⋃
for the set union.
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∼∼A ⊣⊢ A
∼(A&B) ⊣⊢ (∼A)⊕ (∼B)
A`B ⊣⊢ (∼A)⊸ B
∼(A⊗B) ⊣⊢ (∼A)` (∼B)
A`⊥ ⊣⊢ A
A⊗ 1 ⊣⊢ A
A&⊤ ⊣⊢ A
A⊕ 0 ⊣⊢ A
0 ⊣⊢ ∼⊤
⊥ ⊣⊢ ∼ 1
Table 1: Remarkable relationship between the Linear Logic connectives. The symbol ⊣⊢ indicates
provability in both directions.
and the language of MALL is
A ::= ⊤ | 1 | p | ∼A | A⊗A | A⊸ A | A&A | A⊕A .
It suffices to see the other connectives as definitions, following the equivalences of Table 1. We define
⊥ = ∼ 1, 0 = ∼⊤, and A`B = (∼A)⊸ B.
2.2 Resources as propositions
A resource captured by a proposition of Linear Logic, can be atomic like one mole of hydrogen H or
one mole of oxygen O. It can be a tensor combination of resources, e.g., O ⊗ O being two moles of
oxygen. A resource can be a process transforming resources, e.g.,H2O⊗H2O⊸ H2⊗H2⊗O2 would
be the well known chemical reaction of electrolysis. It consumes two moles of water to produce two
moles of dihydrogen and one mole of dioxygen. Working harmoniously with resources and resource
transformation processes with this meticulous control over their combination is made possible using
resource-sensitive logics. In a game where a player is endowed with 2q moles of water and a player
is endowed with q processes of electrolysis, it is possible to consume these resources and produce 2q
moles of hydrogen gas and q of oxygen gas. But not more!
In Section 6.1, we will illustrate our games with an example using chemical reactions. But for the
time being, we explain in more details how the refined operators of Linear Logic can be used to formalize
and grasp a variety of resources. Table 2 reports possible readings of the connectives.
A⊗B A and B simultaneously
A&B a deterministic choice between A and B; not both
A⊕B A or B non-deterministically; not both
A⊸ B A is sufficient to produceB (losing A in the process)
1 vacuous resource
⊤ some resource
Table 2: Possible resource interpretations of formulas.
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Now, whether the occurrence of a resource indicates a consumption or a production of the resources
depends on where a formula appears in the sequent. The sequent of Linear Logic
A ⊢ B
can be read as
“if you give A you can receive B” .
Hence, as it should be expected, we give the resources at the left of the sequent, and receive the resources
at the right of the sequent. Table 3 reports possible readings of the sequents. The linear negation allows
Γ ⊢ A⊗B receive A and B simultaneously
Γ ⊢ A&B choose whether to receive A or B; you can’t receive both
Γ ⊢ A⊕B receive A or B; you don’t choose; you won’t receive both
Γ ⊢ A⊸ B receive a resource that can be used in such a way that, if you give A, you
receive B (losing A in the process)
A⊗B ⊢ ∆ give A and B simultaneously
A&B ⊢ ∆ choose whether to give A or B; you don’t give both
A⊕B ⊢ ∆ give A or B; you don’t choose; you don’t give both
A⊸ B ⊢ ∆ give a resource that can be used in such a way that, if you give A, you
receive B (losing A in the process)
Table 3: Possible resource interpretations of sequents.
one to switch the give/receive mode. The sequent A ⊢ ∼B represents “give A and B, and receive
nothing”. The sequent A,∼B ⊢ ⊥ represents “give A and receive B”.
Example 2. A few items can be obtained from vending machine in exchange of money. For instance,
giving $1 you can choose to receive a chocolate bar or a soft-drink. This is captured by
$1 ⊢ chocobar& drink .
Also, giving $0.8 you can receive 2 packs of gum. This is captured by:
$0.8 ⊢ gum⊗ gum .
In the previous example, the formula chocobar&drink denotes a deliberative choice between chocobar
and drink. One and the other can be obtained from $1, but not both. This is significantly different from
$1 ⊢ chocobar & drink which denotes something more akin to the classical disjunction: chocobar or
drink can be obtained from $1. But for all we know, it might be impossible to actually get one or to get
the other, and we don’t get to decide.
Example 3. We can represent a simple act of gambling. The sequent
$1 ⊢ ($1⊗ $1)⊕ 1
captures the fact that you can give $1 to receive $2 or nothing; but you don’t choose what you get.
The next example uses a good part of the connectives.
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Example 4. We can capture the fact that $17 get you a menu:
$17 ⊢ menu .
The menu consists of a main dish, a side dish, and a dessert:
menu ⊢ dish⊗ side⊗ dessert .
As main dish, you can choose between fish and meat:
dish ⊢ fish&meat .
The side dish depends on the season; you don’t choose; it is either aubergine, or parsnip with leek, or
asparagus:
side ⊢ aubergine⊕ (parsnip⊗ leek)⊕ asparagus .
Finally, as dessert, you choose between the strudel and the chocolate tart. Moreover, you choose whether
to have ice cream for $1 extra.
dessert ⊢ (strudel& chocotart)⊗ (($1⊸ icecream) & 1) .
We have not illustrated the additive unit⊤ yet. The next example hints at the upcoming formalization
of Example 1 in Section 6.2.
Example 5. We can formalize the function of a breadmaker as the resource transformation process
flour ⊸ bread. That is, a breadmaker transforms flour into bread. (Arguably ignoring that we would
also need water and electricity. For simplicity, water and electricity could here be considered resources
that are provably equivalent to the vacuous resource 1.) The sequent
flour, flour, flour⊸ bread ⊢ bread⊗⊤
indicates that with two ‘tokens’ of flour and a breadmaker, one can make bread, and some resources will
remain in excess, viz., flour.
The additive unit ⊤ has some connection with the relationship between linear and affine reasoning
that we now discuss briefly.
2.3 Linear vs. affine reasoning and preferences
Weakening (rules (W ) in the Appendix A) in the logic LOG or lack of it thereof, can play a crucial role
in the satisfaction of the goals of the players. It will also have striking consequences for the algorithmic
solutions of the decision problems that we study in this paper.
In the context of resource-sensitive logic, one rule of weakening (left weakening) says that if some-
thing can be obtained from a set of resources then it can also be obtained from more resources. Symboli-
cally,
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
Weakening gives a monotonic flavor to the process of deduction in the logic. Following the terminology
in Linear Logic, a logic LOG admitting weakening will be said to be affine and a logic LOG without
weakening will just be said to be linear.
Despite the fact the Affine Logic more inference rules than Linear Logic, the unit ⊤ allows one to
simulate the reasoning in Affine Logic with the provability of Linear Logic. Indeed, the sequent Γ ⊢ A is
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provable in a logic LOG with the rule of weakening iff the sequent Γ ⊢ A⊗⊤ is provable the logic LOG
without using weakening.
In the affine case, A,B ⊢ A is a provable sequent. If a player has a goal γ = A, then she will find her
objective satisfied with an outcome {A,B}. In the linear case, we have in general A,B 6⊢ A (unless B
is a vacuous resource equivalent to 1). A player with a goal γ = A will not be satisfied with an outcome
{A,B} as she wants A and nothing more. If she is indeed indifferent to leftover resources, her goal can
be expressed as γ = A⊗⊤, when LOG is linear.
2.4 Some complexities
Before moving to the technical part of this paper, we quickly summarize the complexity of some frag-
ments and variants of Linear Logic that could be used as the LOG parameter in our analysis resource
games.4 The results of this paper will be applicable to every fragment mentioned here. MALL is
PSPACE-complete; MLL is NP-complete; Affine MLL is NP-complete; Affine MALL is PSPACE-
complete; Intuitionistic MALL is PSPACE-complete; Intuitionistic MLL is NP-complete. Something
particularly interesting is that these fragments of Linear Logic behave well computationally also in the
first-order case. First-Order MLL is NP-complete and First-Order MALL is NEXPTIME-complete. See
[14, 10].
3 Individual resource games and decision problems
We formally define our models of individual resource games.
Definition 6. An individual resource game (IRG) is a tupleG = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
• γi is a formula of LOG (i’s goal, or objective);
• ǫi is a finite multiset of formulas of LOG (i’s endowment).
Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn), we define: the set of possible actions of i as the set of mul-
tisets chi(G) = {C | C ⊆ ǫi}, and the set of profiles in G as ch(G) =
∏
i∈N chi(G). When
P = (C1, . . . , Ck) ∈ ch(G) and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then P−i = (C1, . . . , Ci−1, Ci+1, . . . , Ck). That is,
P−i denotes P without player i’s contribution. The outcome of a profile P = (C1, . . . , Cn) is given by
the multiset of resources out(P ) =
⊎
1≤i≤n Ci.
We will define “i strongly prefers P ” in due time, reflecting dichotomous preferences first (Sec. 4)
and parsimonious preferences second (Sec. 5).
Definition 7. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn). A profile P ∈ ch(G) is a Nash equilibrium iff for all
i ∈ N and for all Ci ∈ chi(G), we have that i does not strongly prefer (P−i, Ci) over P .
Let us noteNE(G) the set of Nash equilibria in ch(G).
A basic decision problem is the one of determining whether a choice profile is a Nash equilibrium.
NASH EQUILIBRIUM (NE)
(in) An individual resource gameG and P ∈ ch(G).
(out) P ∈ NE(G)?
4See Appendix B for some elements of complexity that will be useful in the proofs in this paper.
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Some profiles that are not equilibria can have desirable outcomes. Some equilibria can have outcomes
that are undesirable. Hence, it is interesting to investigate how resource distribution schemes influence
how undesirable game equilibria can be eliminated and how desirable game equilibria can be constructed.
In the tradition of social mechanism design, redistribution schemes can be used by a central authority
to enforce some behavior, either by disincentivizing a behavior or incentivizing a behavior.
We will study redistribution schemes in individual resource games. Let ǫ be an endowment function
such that for every player i we have ǫ(i) = ǫi, a multiset of formulas of LOG. A redistribution scheme of
ǫ is an endowment function ǫ′ such that ⊎
i∈N
ǫ(i) =
⊎
i∈N
ǫ′(i) .
We note redis(ǫ) the set of redistributions of the endowment function ǫ.
Given the individual resource game Gǫ = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ(1), . . . , ǫ(n)) we can apply a redistribu-
tion scheme where we modify the endowment function ǫ into ǫ′. We thus obtain the individual resource
gameGǫ
′
= (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ
′(1), . . . , ǫ′(n)).
We will investigate two decision problems inspired by [9], which are related to resource redistribu-
tions. We will look at whether the outcome of a resource game can be rationally eliminated. That is
whether there is a resource redistribution such that no Nash equilibrium of the new resource game yields
this outcome.
RATIONAL ELIMINATION (RE)
(in) An individual resource gameGǫ and P ∈ ch(Gǫ).
(out) Is there a redistribution ǫ′ of ǫ such that for all P ′ ∈ ch(Gǫ
′
), if out(P ′) = out(P ) then P ′ 6∈
NE(Gǫ
′
)?
Conversely, we will look at whether the outcome of a resource game can be rationally constructed.
That is whether there is a resource redistribution such that the outcome is the outcome of some Nash
equilibrium in the new resource game.
RATIONAL CONSTRUCTION (RC)
(in) An individual resource gameGǫ and P ∈ ch(Gǫ).
(out) Is there a redistribution ǫ′ of ǫ such that there is P ′ ∈ ch(Gǫ
′
) where out(P ′) = out(P ) and
P ′ ∈ NE(Gǫ
′
)?
Note that being a game equilibrium is without ambiguity a property of profile. However, after a
redistribution of resources in an individual resource game, the space of actions and the space of profiles
change. Thus, elimination and construction are more about the outcomes of profiles. Section 4.2 and
Section 5.1 will illustrate these decision problems in due time.
4 Dichotomous preferences
Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. Player i, whose goal is γi, realizes
her objectives in a profile P when out(P ) ⊢ γi. That is, the resources in out(P ) can be transformed into
a shareable resource γi. For P ∈ ch(G) and Q ∈ ch(G), we say that player i ∈ N (dichotomously)
strongly prefers P overQ (notedQ ≺i P ) iff out(P ) ⊢ γi and not out(Q) ⊢ γi.
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Proposition 8. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game, two profiles P ∈
ch(G) and Q ∈ ch(G), and a player i ∈ N . When sequent validity in LOG is NP-complete, deciding
whetherQ ≺i P is a NP ∧ coNP = BH2-complete. When sequent validity in LOG is PSPACE-complete,
deciding whether Q ≺i P is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The language corresponding to the problem is L = {(P,Q) | Q ≺i P} = L1 ∩ L2 with L1 =
{(P,Q) | out(P ) ⊢ γi}, and L2 = {(P,Q) | not out(Q) ⊢ γi}. In particular, when the problem of
sequent validity of LOG is in NP, we clearly have that L1 is a NP language and L2 is a coNP language.
For hardness, consider the decision problem VALID-NONVALID that takes in input two sequents
of LOG Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 and Γ2 ⊢ ∆2, and outputs true iff Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 is valid and Γ2 ⊢ ∆2 is not valid. It
is easy to see that if LOG is NP-complete, then VALID-NONVALID is BH2-complete, and if LOG is
PSPACE-complete, then VALID-NONVALID is PSPACE-complete.
We propose a reduction of VALID-NONVALID into the problem of deciding whether in an individual
resource game, a profile is strongly preferred to another profile by a player.
Let Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 and Γ2 ⊢ ∆2 be two sequents of LOG. We can prove using ⊥L, ⊥R, (cut) and (E) that
Γ ⊢ ∆ iff Γ ⊢ ∆,⊥. Thus, we have Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 iff Γ1,∼∆1 ⊢ ⊥, and we have Γ2 ⊢ ∆2 iff Γ2,∼∆2 ⊢ ⊥.5
Now we construct the game G = ({1}, γ1 = ⊥, ǫ1 = Γ1 ⊎ ∼∆1 ⊎ Γ2 ⊎ ∼∆2). It is now easy to see
that VALID-NONVALID instantiated with Γ1 ⊢ ∆1 and Γ2 ⊢ ∆2 returns true iff Player 1 strongly prefers
(Γ1 ⊎ ∼∆1) over (Γ2 ⊎ ∼∆2) in G.
4.1 Finding Nash equilibria
We study the complexity of the problem NASH EQUILIBRIUM with dichotomous preferences.
4.1.1 Hardness
We are about to prove the lower bound of the complexity NE with dichotomous preferences. Before we
do so, observe that by applying the rules L∼ and R∼,
A1, . . . , An ⊢ B1, . . . , Bm iff A1, . . . , An,∼B2, . . . ,∼Bm ⊢ B1
is immediate. Hence, we can, without loss of generality, consider only the intuitionistic sequents of LOG
in the many-to-one reductions of this paper.
Proposition 9. NE is as hard as the problem of checking sequent validity in LOG, even when there is
only one player.
Proof. We reduce the problem of sequent validity for the logic LOG. W.l.o.g., we only consider intu-
itionistic sequents. Let Γ ⊢ δ be the intuitionistic sequent where Γ is an arbitrary multiset of formulas of
LOG and δ is an arbitrary formula.
We can construct the individual resource game G such that G = ({1}, δ,Γ ∪ {δ}). G is thus the
one-player individual resource game where Player 1’s goal is to achieve δ, and Player 1 is endowed with
Γ ∪ {δ} (this is a set union but we could have chosen the endowment Γ ⊎ {δ} as well). A profile in G is
a choice of Player 1, that is, a subset C1 of Γ ∪ {δ}. In this case for any profile P in G, out(P ) = P .
We show that Γ ⊢ δ iff Γ ∈ NE(G).
From left to right, suppose that Γ ⊢ δ. We need to show that Γ ∈ NE(G). That is, for all C1 ⊆
Γ ∪ {δ}, if C1 ⊢ δ then Γ ⊢ δ. Since we supposed Γ ⊢ δ, this is trivially true.
From right to left, suppose that Γ ∈ NE(G). This means that for all C1 ⊆ Γ ∪ {δ}, if C1 ⊢ δ then
Γ ⊢ δ. Let in particular C1 = {δ}. Indeed, C1 ⊆ Γ ∪ {δ}. Moreover, by (ax) we have δ ⊢ δ. Hence,
Γ ⊢ δ follows.
5For Γ = {A1, . . . , Ak} we note ∼Γ the set {∼A1, . . . ,∼Ak}.
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4.1.2 Algorithms
To establish an upper bound on the complexity of NE let us first outline an algorithm for solving its
complement. That is, checking whether a profile is not a Nash equilibrium. Let P ∈ ch(G) be a profile.
To determine whether P 6∈ NE(G), we can employ a simple non-deterministic algorithm, showed as
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 General algorithm for co-NE
1: non-deterministically guess (i, C′i) ∈ N × chi(G).
2: return P ≺i (P−i, C′i).
Proposition 10. If the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in NP then NE is in coNPBH2 and
indeed in Π
p
2. If the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in PSPACE then NE is in PSPACE.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. If sequent validity in LOG is in NP, we can check P ≺i (P−i, C′i) in BH2
(Prop. 8). Thus we can check whether P 6∈ NE(G) in NPBH2 . Finally, we can solve NE in coNPBH2 . It
is the case that BH2 ⊆ ∆
p
2, and also that NP
∆
p
2 = Σp2 so we can solve NE in Π
p
2. The proof for the case
of PSPACE also proceeds as an analysis of Algorithm 1.
Affine logic admits the rule of weakening (W ), which allows one to discard resources. In this set-
ting, if a player can achieve her goal with the resources Γ, she can as well achieve her goal with the
resources Γ ∪ {A}. A consequence is the following lemma, which will have a significant impact on the
computational complexity of NE.
Lemma 11. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. When LOG is affine,
P 6∈ NE(G) iff ∃i ∈ N : P ≺i (P−i, ǫi).
Proof. Suppose P 6∈ NE(G). There is i ∈ N and Ci ∈ chi(G) s.t. P ≺i (P−i, Ci). By definition,
out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢ γi and out(P ) 6⊢ γi. We have Ci ⊆ ǫi, so by applying weakening (W ) with every
instance of formulas in ǫi \ Ci, we can prove that out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi. We thus have that there is i ∈ N
s.t. P ≺i (P−i, ǫi). The other way around is immediate from the definition of Nash equilibria.
It means that, in a profile, if no player has an incentive to deviate by making available their whole
endowment, then the profile is a Nash equilibrium. The very profile where all the players make available
their whole endowment is trivially such a profile. The next proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 12. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. When LOG is
affine: NE(G) 6= ∅ and (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) ∈ NE(G).
Lemma 11 also helps us to establish the following result.
Proposition 13. When LOG is affine, if the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in NP then
NE is in PNP||. If the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in PSPACE then NE is in PSPACE.
Proof. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game and let P ∈ ch(G) be a
profile. One can check whether P ∈ NE(G) with Algorithm 2.
For correctness, note that the instructions of the lines 2−4 are equivalent to a test of whether out(P ) 6⊢
γi and out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi, that is, P ≺i (P−i, ǫi). Lemma 11 ensures that exactly when there is an i ∈ N
such that P ≺i (P−i, ǫi) we can conclude that P is not a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose sequent validity in LOG is in NP. The algorithm can be simulated by a deterministic oracle
Turing machine in polynomial time with 2n non-adaptive queries to an NP oracle. Indeed, P ∈ NE(G)
is thus a PNP||[2n] predicate. The problem is in PNP||. When sequent validity in LOG is in PSPACE, we
obtain a complexity of PPSPACE = PSPACE.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for NE with dichotomous preferences and affine LOG
1: for each i ∈ N do:
2: if (out(P ) ⊢ γi):
3: continue;
4: else if (out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi):
5: return false.
6: return true.
4.2 Elimination
A very simple illustration of RATIONAL ELIMINATION is given by the individual resource gameGǫ =
({1, 2}, γ1 = B, γ2 = A, {A}, {B}). There are two players. Player 1 wantsB but is endowed with {A},
while Player 2 wants A but is endowed with {B}. The game Gǫ can be represented as on Figure 1. (We
indicate the realized objectives assuming that LOG is affine.)
1 2 ∅ {B}
∅ ∅ {B} : γ1
{A} {A} : γ2 {A,B} : γ1, γ2
Figure 1: The gameGǫ. γ1 and γ2 indicate that Player 1 and Player 2 have their goals satisfied, assuming
LOG is affine. The symbol denotes a Nash Equilibrium.
One can readily check that all profiles are Nash equilibria. However, the profile ({A}, {B}) is more
‘socially desirable’ than the others since it satisfies both players’ goal.
A centralized authority could effectively eliminate the others by redistributing the resources present
in Gǫ so as to obtain Gǫ
′
= ({1, 2}, γ1 = B, γ2 = A, {B}, {A}). The game G
ǫ′ can be represented as
on Figure 2.
1 2 ∅ {A}
∅ ∅ {A} : γ2
{B} {B} : γ1 {A,B} : γ1, γ2
Figure 2: The gameGǫ
′
.
The only Nash equilibrium is now the one with outcome {B,A}.
4.2.1 Algorithms
As a consequence of Prop. 12, we already know that:
Proposition 14. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. When LOG is
affine, the profile P such that out(P ) =
⊎
j ǫj is not rationally eliminable.
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This is very specific to the affine case (and dichotomous preferences), and even then, it is of course not
true of all Nash equilibria. To decide whether some outcome is rationally eliminable, one naı¨ve approach
consists in trying all possible redistributions and check whether the outcome is a Nash equilibrium in the
resulting individual resource game. Instead, we are going to exploit a pleasant property, analogous to [9,
Corollary 4].
LetGǫ = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ(1), . . . , ǫ(n)) be an individual resource game. For each player i ∈ N , we
define G[ǫ⊲i] where [ǫ ⊲ i] is the redistribution of ǫ where all resources are assigned to i, that is:
[ǫ ⊲ i](j) =
{⊎
k∈N ǫ(k) when j = i
∅ otherwise.
Because there is only one active player inG[ǫ⊲i], we will sometimes write a profile ofG[ǫ⊲i] as (Ci) with
Ci ∈ chi(G[ǫ⊲i]) instead of (∅, . . . , ∅, Ci, ∅, . . . , ∅), by abuse of notation.
Lemma 15. Let Gǫ be an individual resource game and P ∈ ch(Gǫ). P is rationally eliminable iff there
is a player i ∈ N and a profileQ ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]), such that out(Q) = out(P ) andQ 6∈ NE(G[ǫ⊲i]).
Proof. From right to left. Suppose Q 6∈ NE(G[ǫ⊲i]) for some i ∈ N . Let also P ∈ ch(Gǫ) be a profile
and assume out(P ) = out(Q). When there is at most one player with a non-empty endowment, as in
[ǫ ⊲ i], there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of profiles and the set of outcomes. Thus,
there is one and only one profile in G[ǫ⊲i] with outcome out(P ) and it is Q. So there is a redistribution
of ǫ, namely [ǫ ⊲ i], such that for all profiles Q ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]) with outcome out(P ), we have Q 6∈
NE(G[ǫ⊲i]). So P is rationally eliminable.
From left to right. Suppose that P is rationally eliminable. Thus, there is a redistribution ǫ′ of ǫ
such that for all P ′ ∈ ch(Gǫ
′
), if out(P ′) = out(P ) then P ′ 6∈ NE(Gǫ
′
). So let R ∈ ch(Gǫ
′
) be an
arbitrary profile with out(R) = out(P ). By assumption, we have that R 6∈ NE(Gǫ
′
). By definition
of Nash equilibria, this means that there is i ∈ N and C′i ∈ chi(G
ǫ′) such that R ≺i (R−i, C′i). Now
consider the game G[ǫ⊲i]. We have out(R) ∈ chi(G[ǫ⊲i]) and out((R−i, C′i)) ∈ chi(G
[ǫ⊲i]). Let the
profile R1 ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]) with R1i = out(R) and R
1
j = ∅ when j 6= i. Let R
2 ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]) be the profile
with R2i = out((R−i, C
′
i)) and R
2
j = ∅ when j 6= i. Since, R ≺i (R−i, C
′
i), we also have R
1 ≺i R2.
So R1 6∈ NE(G[ǫ⊲i]). The profile R1 is the only profile of G[ǫ⊲i] with outcome out(P ). So we can
conclude.
We establish an upper bound on the complexity of RE when LOG does not admit the weakening rule.
Proposition 16. When LOG is linear, RE is in NPBH2 and indeed in Σp2 when LOG is in NP, and in
PSPACE when LOG is in PSPACE.
Proof. Let P ∈ ch(Gǫ) be a profile. To determine whether P is rationally eliminable, we can use
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 General algorithm for RE
1: non-deterministically guess (i, C′i) ∈ N × chi(G
[ǫ⊲i]).
2: return P ≺i (P−i, C′i).
Straightforwardly, it guesses a player i and a deviation in the gameG[ǫ⊲i] for Player i from the profile
(out(P )) ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]), and checks whether Player i has an incentive to do this deviation. By Lemma 15,
if such a player and deviation exist and only if they exist, the profile P is rationally eliminable in Gǫ. So
the algorithm is correct. It can of course be simulated by a non-deterministic oracle Turing machine with
one call to an oracle for P ≺i (P−i, C′i). Prop. 8 informs us of a containing class of this oracle.
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When LOG admits the weakening rule, we can propose a surprisingly simple algorithm, which takes
advantage of both Lemma 11 and Lemma 15.
Proposition 17. When LOG is affine, RE is in PNP|| when LOG is in NP, and in PSPACE when LOG is
in PSPACE.
Proof. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game and let P ∈ ch(G) be a
profile. Consider Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for RE with dichotomous preferences and affine LOG
1: for each i ∈ N do:
2: if (P ≺i ([ǫ ⊲ i](i))):
3: return true.
4: return false.
The algorithm is correct. Indeed, by Lemma 15, P is eliminable in G iff there is i ∈ N where
(out(P )) 6∈ NE(G[ǫ⊲i]). By Lemma 11, we know that (out(P )) 6∈ NE(G[ǫ⊲i]) iff P ≺i ([ǫ ⊲ i](i)).
Notice that the test of line 2 is equivalent to P 6⊢ γi and [ǫ ⊲ i](i) ⊢ γi. Thus, it can be simulated by a
deterministic oracle Turing machine in polynomial time with at most 2n non-adaptive queries to an oracle
for the problem of sequent validity. When the problem of sequent validity in LOG is in NP it yields a
complexity of PNP||. When it is in PSPACE, it yields a complexity of PSPACE.
4.2.2 Hardness
The linear and affine cases both use the same proof strategy which we present at once.
Proposition 18. RE is as hard as the problem of checking sequent invalidity in LOG.
Proof. Let Γ ⊢ δ be an arbitrary intuitionistic sequent. Let ϕ = Γ∗ ⊸ δ. (Remember that Γ∗ =⊗
A∈ΓA.) Let G
ǫ = ({1, 2}, ϕ,1, ∅, {ϕ}) be an individual resource game. So, we have ǫ1 = ∅ and
ǫ2 = {ϕ}. There is only one other distinct redistribution ǫ′ of ǫ where ǫ′1 = {ϕ} and ǫ
′
2 = ∅. It is the case
that redis(ǫ) = {ǫ, ǫ′}. Let Gǫ
′
= ({1, 2}, ϕ,1, {ϕ}, ∅) be the individual resource game resulting from
the redistribution ǫ′. Both games are represented on Figure 3.
1 2 ∅ {ϕ}
∅ ∅ {ϕ}
(a) Gǫ.
1 2 ∅
∅ ∅
{ϕ} {ϕ}
(b) Gǫ
′
.
Figure 3: Games Gǫ andGǫ
′
. The profile (∅, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium in Gǫ. The profile (∅, ∅) is a Nash
equilibrium in Gǫ
′
iff Γ ⊢ δ. (The profile ({ϕ}, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium in Gǫ
′
. Depending on whether
Γ ⊢ δ and whether LOG is linear or affine, (∅, {ϕ}) may or may not be Nash equilibria in Gǫ. This is
inconsequential for the reduction in the proof of Prop. 18.)
We show that both in the case of linear and of affine logics, we have Γ 6⊢ δ iff (∅, ∅) is rationally
eliminable in Gǫ.
We first show that
Γ ⊢ δ iff ∅ ⊢ ϕ . (1)
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From left to right, suppose Γ ⊢ δ. By applying ⊗L enough times we obtain Γ∗ ⊢ δ. Then we obtain
∅ ⊢ Γ∗ ⊸ δ using⊸R. From right to left, suppose ∅ ⊢ Γ∗⊸ δ. With (ax) and⊗R we can show Γ ⊢ Γ∗.
Using ⊗R on the sequents Γ ⊢ Γ∗ and ∅ ⊢ Γ∗⊸ δ we obtain
Γ ⊢ Γ∗ ⊗ Γ∗⊸ δ . (2)
Without assumption we can also show
Γ∗ ⊗ Γ∗⊸ δ ⊢ δ , (3)
using the rules (ax),⊸L, and ⊗L. We conclude that Γ ⊢ δ using (cut) on the sequents 2 and 3.
We can proceed. Suppose Γ 6⊢ δ. We show that (∅, ∅) is not a Nash equilibrium in Gǫ
′
. Since Γ 6⊢ δ,
we also have ∅ 6⊢ ϕ (by Equation 1). On the other hand, using (ax), we have {ϕ} ⊢ ϕ. So in the profile
(∅, ∅), Player 1 has an incentive to deviate to the profile ({ϕ}, ∅). So (∅, ∅) is not a Nash Equilibrium in
Gǫ
′
.
Suppose Γ ⊢ δ. We show that (∅, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium both in Gǫ and in Gǫ
′
.
In Gǫ. We have ∅ ⊢ 1 from 1R, so Player 2 has no incentive to deviate from the profile (∅, ∅) in Gǫ.
Moreover, Player 1 is dummy in Gǫ. So (∅, ∅) is a Nash Equilibrium in Gǫ.
InGǫ
′
. Since Γ ⊢ δ, we also have ∅ ⊢ ϕ (by Equation 1), so Player 1 has no incentive to deviate from
the profile (∅, ∅) in Gǫ
′
. Moreover, Player 2 is dummy in Gǫ
′
. So (∅, ∅) is a Nash Equilibrium in Gǫ
′
.
4.3 Construction
For elimination, Lemma 15 provided a remarkable necessary and sufficient condition for the rational
eliminability of a profile. For the rational constructibility of a profile, we can only indicatively provide
sufficient conditions. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an IRG, and let P ∈ ch(G) be a profile in
G. If there is a player i ∈ N such that out(P ) ⊢ γi, then P can be rationally constructed by redistributing
all the resources to Player i. Also, if there a player i ∈ N such that
⊎
k∈N ǫk 6⊢ γi ⊗ ⊤, then P can be
rationally constructed by redistributing all the resources to Player i.
We tackle the complexity of RATIONAL CONSTRUCTION with dichotomous preferences.
4.3.1 Hardness
We prove a lower bound of the problem RC in presence of dichotomous preferences.
Proposition 19. RC is as hard as the problem of checking sequent validity in LOG.
Proof. Let ϕ = Γ∗ ⊸ δ and G = ({1}, ϕ, ǫ1 = {ϕ}). We can see that (∅) ∈ NE(G) iff ∅ ⊢ ϕ, that is
Γ ⊢ δ. As redis(ǫ) = {ǫ}, we conclude that: for every sequent Γ ⊢ δ, (∅) is rationally constructible in G
iff Γ ⊢ δ is provable.
4.3.2 Algorithms
Let Gǫ be an individual resource game, and let P ∈ ch(Gǫ). To decide whether the profile P can
be rationally constructed we can use Algorithm 5. This algorithm will serve for all cases of rational
construction in this paper.
The algorithmic analysis is rather simple: we use the problemNE as a blackbox, for which complexity
upper bounds have been established in Prop. 10 and Prop. 13.
Proposition 20. When LOG is in NP, RC is in Σ
p
3. When LOG is in PSPACE, RC is in PSPACE.
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Algorithm 5 General algorithm for RC
1: non-deterministically guess (ǫ′, P ′) ∈ redis(ǫ)× ch(Gǫ
′
).
2: return out(P ′) = out(P ) and P ′ ∈ NE(Gǫ
′
).
Proof. When LOG is in NP, from Prop. 10, we know that the test of line 2 is Πp2-easy. So RC is in
NPΠ
p
2 = Σp3. The case for LOG in PSPACE is similar.
Again, an affine LOG seems to bring some relative algorithmic ease.
Proposition 21. If LOG is affine, when LOG is in NP, RC is in Σ
p
2. When LOG is in PSPACE, RC is in
PSPACE.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 20, using the result of Prop. 13 and the fact that NPP
NP||
⊆
NP∆
p
2 = Σp2.
5 Parsimonious preferences
Weakening (W ) is sometimes a desirable property of LOG and of our preferences of resources. However,
it has the untoward consequence of incentivizing players to spend all their resources in individual resource
games with dichotomous preferences. This is well exemplified for instance by Prop. 12.
We can teach our players parsimony by attaching to them finer preferences that take into account the
realization of their objective, but also the optimality of their contribution.
In an individual resource game G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn), we now say that player i ∈ N
(parsimoniously) strongly prefers P ∈ ch(G) over Q ∈ ch(G) (noted Q ≺i P ) iff one of the following
conditions is satisfied:
1. not out(P ) ⊢ γi and not out(Q) ⊢ γi and Pi ⊂ Qi;
2. out(P ) ⊢ γi and not out(Q) ⊢ γi;
3. out(P ) ⊢ γi and out(Q) ⊢ γi and Pi ⊂ Qi.
Similar preferences have been called pseudo-dichotomous in the literature.
We recognise that the second condition corresponds to profile P being dichotomously strongly pre-
ferred by Player i to profile Q. The following proposition is a simple consequence.
Proposition 22. If Player i dichotomously strongly prefers P over Q then Player i parsimoniously
strongly prefers P over Q.
This has another immediate consequence on Nash equilibria.
Proposition 23. If a profile P is a Nash equilibrium in presence of parsimonious preferences, then P is
a Nash equilibrium in presence of dichotomous preferences.
Proof. Let≺di (resp.,≺
p
i ) denote Player i’s parsimonious (resp., dichotomous) preferences; LetNEd(G)
(resp., NEp(G)) denote the set of Nash equilibria in G when considering dichotomous (resp., parsimo-
nious) preferences. Now suppose that P ∈ NEp(G). That is, for every i ∈ N and for every Ci ∈ chi(G)
we have not P ≺pi (Ci, P−i), and by Prop. 22, we have not P ≺
d
i (Ci, P−i). So P ∈ NEd(G).
Proposition 23 indicates that every Nash equilibrium in presence of parsimonious preference is also a
Nash equilibrium in presence of dichotomous preference. The next proposition, which will help us later
to prove some hardness result, says that the other way around holds when the profile is the one where
every player plays the empty set of resources.
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Proposition 24. The profile (∅, . . . , ∅) is a Nash equilibrium in presence of parsimonious preferences iff
it is a Nash equilibrium in presence of dichotomous preferences.
Proof. Left to right is a consequence of Prop. 23. For right to left, assume (∅, . . . , ∅) is in NEd(G).
With parsimonious preferences, the only incentive to deviate from a Nash equilibrium in presence of
dichotomous preference, would be to play a smaller multiset of resources. This is impossible in (∅, . . . , ∅).
We now address the complexity of the decision problem of deciding whether a player parsimoniously
strongly prefers a profile over another profile.
Proposition 25. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. Let also P ∈
ch(G) and Q ∈ ch(G) be two profiles, and i ∈ N be a player. When sequent validity in LOG is in NP,
deciding whetherQ ≺i P is a problem in PNP||[2]. When sequent validity in LOG is in PSPACE, deciding
whether Q ≺i P is a problem in PSPACE.
Proof. First, we can evaluate Pi ⊆ Qi efficiently. We store the result in the Boolean variable v⊆.
We can then perform two non-adaptive queries to an oracle to solve sequent validity in LOG on
out(P ) ⊢ γi and on out(Q) ⊢ γi, and store the results in the Boolean variables vP and vQ respectively.
The formula ((¬vp ∧ ¬vq ∧ v⊆) ∨ (vp ∧ ¬vq) ∨ (vp ∧ vq ∧ v⊆)) is true iff Q ≺i P .
This yields a correct algorithm for decidingQ ≺i P in P
NP||[2] when LOG is in NP, and in PSPACE
when LOG is in PSPACE.
To compare the complexity of dichotomous and parsimonious preferences, remember from Prop. 8
that when LOG is in NP, the same problem for dichotomous preferences is in BH2. From [11] we know
that PNP||[1] ⊆ BH2 ⊆ P
NP||[2]. Is is not known whether these inclusions are strict.
5.1 Illustration of redistribution and parsimony
Consider again the individual resource game of Section 4.2. (Unless stated otherwise, suppose we are in
the affine case.) With parsimonious preferences, we haveNE(G) = {(∅, ∅)}. The profile ({A}, {B}) is
not a Nash equilibrium as it was with dichotomous preferences. It would be more desirable from a social
welfare point of view than any other outcome (it satisfies both players), but the players would nonetheless
not be individually rational by choosing it. They have indeed no bearing upon the outcome that satisfies
them and thus are rational in withholding their resources.
Nonetheless, like in the case of dichotomous preference, we can effectively eliminate the current Nash
equilibrium in Gǫ and construct the Nash equilibrium yielding {A,B} by redistributing the resources
present in Gǫ so as to obtain Gǫ
′
= ({1, 2}, γ1 = B, γ2 = A, {B}, {A}). The only Nash equilibrium is
now ({B}, {A}).
Unlike dichotomous preferences, parsimonious preferences do not ensure the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in the affine case. Consider the individual resource game Hǫ = ({1, 2}, γ1 = A, γ2 =
A⊗A, {A}, {A}). There are two players. The gameHǫ can be represented as on Figure 4.
The game Hǫ has no Nash equilibrium: At (∅, ∅), Player 1 does not realize her objective, but she
can deviate and play {A} to satisfy it. At ({A}, ∅), Player 2 has an incentive to deviate and play {A} to
realize her objective. At ({A}, {A}) Player 1 has an incentive to deviate and play ∅. (In the affine case
this is because she can still satisfy her objective by contributing less. In the linear case, this is because
she can satisfy her objective while she does not before deviating.) At (∅, {A}), Player 2 does not satisfy
her objective and thus has an incentive to deviate to play ∅.
However, we can construct the Nash equilibrium yielding {A,A}. Let ǫ′ be the redistribution of ǫ
such that ǫ′(2) = {A,A} and ǫ′(1) = ∅. We obtain the game depicted on Figure 5.
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1 2 ∅ {A}
∅ ∅ {A} : γ1
{A} {A} : γ1 {A,A} : γ1, γ2
Figure 4: The gameHǫ. There is no Nash Equilibrium under parsimonious preferences.
1 2 ∅ {A} {A,A}
∅ ∅ {A} : γ1 {A,A} : γ1, γ2
Figure 5: The gameHǫ
′
. The symbol denotes a Nash Equilibrium.
In Hǫ
′
, by assigning all the resources to Player 2, the profile (∅, {A,A}) is a Nash equilibrium and
the only one. In affine logics, both players satisfy their objectives, but only Player 2 does when the logic
is linear.
5.2 Finding Nash equilibria
We study the complexity of NASH EQUILIBRIUM with parsimonious preferences.
5.2.1 Hardness
We are not getting used to many-to-one reductions from sequent (in)validity. It was a fruitful problem in
presence of dichotomous preference, and it will remain one in presence of parsimonious preferences. We
prove a complexity lower bound for the problem of NE in presence of parsimonious preferences.
Proposition 26. The problem NE is as hard as the problem of checking sequent invalidity in LOG, even
when there is only one player.
Proof. As before, we consider w.l.o.g. only the intuitionistic sequents of LOG in the following reduction.
Let Γ ⊢ δ be an intuitionistic sequent of LOG. We define ϕ = Γ∗ ⊸ δ. We can construct the
individual resource game G such that G = ({1}, ϕ, {ϕ}). In G, Player 1 has exactly two choices:
chi(G) = {∅, {ϕ}}.
We show that Γ ⊢ δ iff ϕ 6∈ NE(G).
Suppose ({ϕ}) 6∈ NE(G). So ({ϕ}) ≺1 (∅). Since by (ax) ϕ ⊢ ϕ (the profile ({ϕ}) satisfies
Player 1’s objectives) and ∅ ⊂ {ϕ} (Player 1’s contribution is strictly less in the profile (∅) than it is in
({ϕ})), it must be that ∅ ⊢ ϕ. We infer Γ ⊢ δ, as we did in part of the proof of Prop. 18.
Suppose Γ ⊢ δ. We obtain Γ∗ ⊢ δ by using ⊗L enough times, and we deduce ⊢ ϕ with⊸R. We thus
have ∅ ⊢ ϕ and ∅ ⊂ {ϕ}. So ({ϕ}) ≺1 (∅) and ({ϕ}) 6∈ NE(G).
5.2.2 Algorithms
In the individual resource game G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn), we can use Algorithm 1 to check
whether a profile P 6∈ NE(G), even for parsimonious preferences. We have a result analogous to
Prop. 10 for parsimonious preferences.
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Proposition 27. If the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in NP then NE is in Π
p
2. If the
problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in PSPACE then NE is in PSPACE.
Proof. We use Prop. 25 and the fact that coNPP
NP||[2][1] ⊆ coNPP
NP
= coNP∆
p
2 = coΣp2 = Π
p
2.
When LOG is affine, we can do better than using Algorithm 1. We first state a technical lemma which
is analogous to Lemma 11.
Lemma 28. Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game. When LOG is affine,
P 6∈ NE(G) iff ∃i ∈ N : s.t. either:
1. out(P ) 6⊢ γi and Pi 6= ∅;
2. out(P ) 6⊢ γi and out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi;
3. out(P ) ⊢ γi and ∃A ∈ Pi: out((P−i, Pi \ {A})) ⊢ γi.
Proof. Right to left is immediate. From left to right, suppose P 6∈ NE(G). So there exists i ∈ N and
Ci ∈ chi(G) such that out(P ) ≺i out((P−i, Ci)). There are three cases to consider:
1. not out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢ γi and not out(P ) ⊢ γi and Ci ⊂ Pi;
2. out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢ γi and not out(P ) ⊢ γi;
3. out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢ γi and out(P ) ⊢ γi and Ci ⊂ Pi.
Suppose (1) is the case. It implies that there is Ci ⊂ Pi and thus that Pi 6= ∅. Suppose (2) is the case. We
essentially use the same argument as the one used in the proof of Lemma 11. We have out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢
γi. By applying weakening (|ǫi| − |Ci|) times, we easily obtain that out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi. Suppose (3)
is the case. We thus have out((P−i, Ci)) ⊢ γi with Ci ⊂ Pi. Take a formula A ∈ Pi \ Ci. Then, by
applying weakening (|Pi| − |Ci| − 1) times, we easily obtain that out((P−i, Pi \ {A})) ⊢ γi.
Algorithm 6 can then be used to check whether P ∈ NE(G).6
Algorithm 6 Algorithm for NE with parsimonious preferences and affine LOG
1: for each i ∈ N do:
2: if (out(P ) ⊢ γi) : {
3: for each A ∈ Pi do:
4: if (out((P−i, Pi \ {A})) ⊢ γi):
5: return false.
6: } else {
7: if (out((P−i, ǫi)) ⊢ γi):
8: return false.
9: if (Pi 6= ∅):
10: return false.
11: }
12: return true.
Proposition 29. When LOG is affine, if the problem of sequent validity checking of LOG is in NP and
we adopt parsimonious preferences, then NE is in PNP||. If the problem of sequent validity checking of
LOG is in PSPACE, then NE is in PSPACE.
Proof. Lemma 28 justifies the correctness of Algorithm 6. The algorithm can be simulated by a deter-
ministic oracle Turing machine in polynomial time with less than Σi∈N (1+ |Pi|) non-adaptive queries to
an oracle for sequent validity in LOG. When the complexity of sequent validity in LOG is in NP it yields
a complexity of PNP||.
6Algorithm 6 corrects an omission in [26, Algo. 5] by adding “if (Pi 6= ∅): return false” lines 9 and 10.
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5.3 Elimination
We study the complexity of RATIONAL ELIMINATION with parsimonious preferences.
5.3.1 Algorithms
Lemma 15 also holds for parsimonious preferences. It is easy to see that the proof carries over.
Algorithm 3 can still be used in the case of parsimonious preferences because Lemma 15 is still
granted. We thus have the analog to Prop. 16 for parsimonious preferences.
Proposition 30. When LOG is linear, RE is in Σ
p
2 when LOG is in NP, and in PSPACE when LOG is in
PSPACE.
Proof. We use Prop. 25 and the fact that NPP
NP||[2][1] ⊆ NPP
NP
= NP∆
p
2 = Σp2.
Let G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) be an individual resource game and let P ∈ ch(G) be a profile.
We can use Algorithm 7 to check whether a profile P ∈ ch(G) is rationally eliminable.
Algorithm 7 Algorithm for RE with parsimonious preferences and affine LOG
1: for each i ∈ N do:
2: if ((out(P )) ≺i ([ǫ ⊲ i](i))):
3: return true.
4: for each A ∈ out(P ):
5: if ((out(P )) ≺i (out(P ) \ {A})):
6: return true.
7: return false.
Proposition 31. When LOG is affine, RE is in PNP|| when LOG is in NP. It is in PSPACE when LOG is
in PSPACE.
Proof. Lemma 15 which still holds with parsimonious preferences ensures that it is enough to consider
the redistributions [ǫ ⊲ i] for some player i. Algorithm 7, then checks for each of these redistributions
whether Player i has an incentive to deviate in the game G[ǫ⊲i] from the profile (out(P )) ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i])
to any one of ([ǫ ⊲ i](i)) ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]) and (out(P ) \ {A}) ∈ ch(G[ǫ⊲i]) for some A ∈ out(P ). It is
weakening (W ) that justifies that it is enough to consider these profiles, because X 6⊢ γi implies Y 6⊢ γi
for any couple of multisets Y ⊆ X . The correctness of Algorithm 7 follows.
The tests of line 2 and line 5 only involve the following instances of the sequent validity decision
problem: (out(P )) ⊢ γi and ([ǫ ⊲ i](i)) ⊢ γi for very Player i ∈ N , and (out(P ) \ {A}) ⊢ γi, for every
Player i ∈ N and every formula A ∈ out(P ). The algorithm can thus be simulated by a deterministic
oracle Turing machine in polynomial time with at most |N |(|out(P )|+2) non-adaptive calls to an oracle
for sequent validity.
5.3.2 Hardness
After Prop. 24 and the proof of Prop. 18, the following proposition does not come as a surprise.
Proposition 32. RE is as hard as the problem of checking sequent invalidity in LOG.
Proof. Let Γ ⊢ δ be an arbitrary intuitionistic sequent. We construct the same game as in the proof of
Prop. 18. Let ϕ = Γ∗⊸ δ. Let Gǫ = ({1, 2}, ϕ,1, ∅, {ϕ}).
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In the proof of Prop. 18, we showed that, in presence of dichotomous preferences, both in the case of
linear and of affine logics, we have Γ 6⊢ δ iff (∅, ∅) is rationally eliminable in Gǫ.
Now with Prop. 24, we know that (∅, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium in presence of dichotomous preferences
iff it is a Nash equilibrium in presence of parsimonious preferences (both in Gǫ andGǫ
′
, and no matter if
LOG is linear or affine, or if Γ ⊢ δ or Γ 6⊢ δ).
Hence, we have Γ 6⊢ δ iff (∅, ∅) is rationally eliminable in Gǫ, also in presence of parsimonious
preferences.
5.4 Construction
Finally, we tackle the complexity of RATIONAL CONSTRUCTION with parsimonious preferences.
5.4.1 Hardness
We establish a complexity lower bound for the problem of RC in presence of parsimonious preferences.
Proposition 33. RC is as hard as the problem of checking sequent invalidity in LOG.
Proof. Consider the games in the proof of Prop. 32. We can see that both for linear and affine logics we
have that Γ 6⊢ δ iff ({ϕ}, ∅) can be rationally constructed in Gǫ
′
.
5.4.2 Algorithms
Our algorithmic analysis is very similar to the analysis we made when the preferences are dichotomous
in Section 4.3.2. Let Gǫ be an individual resource game and P ∈ ch(Gǫ). To decide whether P can be
rationally constructed we can reuse Algorithm 5.
Again, we use the problem NE as a blackbox, for which complexity upper bounds have been estab-
lished in Prop. 27 and Prop. 29.
Proposition 34. When LOG is in NP, RC is in Σ
p
3. When LOG is in PSPACE, RC is in PSPACE.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 20, using the result of Prop. 27.
The next proposition also comes without surprise.
Proposition 35. If LOG is affine, when LOG is in NP, RC is in Σ
p
2. When LOG is in PSPACE, RC is in
PSPACE.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 21, using the result of Prop. 29.
6 Examples
We present more thorough examples. They involve several resources and objectives that are modelled
with a variety of logical operands. We use the opportunity to present fully the important formal proofs of
the realized objectives.
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6.1 Alan and the fish
We first introduce the resources involved and how they are built in the logical language.
• Basic resources:
– one mole of dioxygen: O2
– one mole of dihydrogen: H2
– one mole of water: H2O
– one ‘token’ of thirst: T
• Anti-resources can be captured via the linear negation:
– one thirst quencher: ∼T
• Resource transformation processes:
– one process of electrolysis: E = H2O ⊗H2O⊸ H2 ⊗H2 ⊗O2
– one process of drinking water: D = H2O⊸ ∼T
Game definition. Let Gǫaf = ({a, f}, γa, γf , ǫa, ǫf) be the individual resource game with two players,
Alan a and the Fish f . The fish wants one mole of dioxygen: γf = O2. Alan wants one mole of dioxygen
for his fish and wants to quench his thirst: γa = O2 ⊗∼T .
In the game Gǫaf , Alan is endowed with ǫa = {D,E}. He can drink once and can electrolysis water
once. The fish is endowed with three tokens of water ǫf = {H2O,H2O,H2O}.
We suppose that LOG is affine. For this example, we will consider both cases of dichotomous and
parsimonious preferences.
As we did before, we will represent a Nash equilibrium under dichotomous preferences with the
symbol , and under parsimonious preferences with the symbol . By Prop 23, the latter implies the
former. Then, when a profile is a Nash equilibrium under both dichotomous and parsimonious preferences
we will use the symbol. The game Gǫaf and the realized objectives can be depicted as on Figure 6.
a
f ∅ {H2O} {H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O,H2O}
∅ ∅ {H2O} {H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O,H2O}
{D} {D} {D,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O,H2O}
{E} {E} {E,H2O} {E,H2O,H2O} : γf {E,H2O,H2O,H2O} : γf
{D,E} {D,E} {D,E,H2O} {D,E,H2O,H2O} : γf {D,E,H2O,H2O,H2O} : γa, γf
Figure 6: The game Gǫaf . LOG is affine. The symbol  marks the Nash equilibria under dichotomous.
The symbol marks the profiles that are also Nash equilibria under both dichotomous and parsimonious
preferences.
We show next how the objectives are realized.
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Formal proofs of the realized objectives. The proof of H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf will be instrumental for
the others. We label it Proof ⋆ for reuse.
ax
H2O ⊢ H2O
ax
H2O ⊢ H2O
⊗R
H2O,H2O ⊢ H2O ⊗H2O
ax
O2 ⊢ O2
W
O2, H2 ⊗H2 ⊢ O2
E
H2 ⊗H2, O2 ⊢ O2
⊗L
H2 ⊗H2 ⊗O2 ⊢ O2
⊸L
H2O,H2O,H2O ⊗H2O⊸ H2 ⊗H2 ⊗O2 ⊢ O2
definition
H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
Proof ⋆
The other realized objectives of the fish are immediate using Proof ⋆ and the weakening rule. We prove
thatH2O,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf ,D,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf , andD,H2O,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf .
...
Proof ⋆
H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
W
H2O,H2O,E,H2O ⊢ γf
E
H2O,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
...
Proof ⋆
H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
W
H2O,H2O,E,D ⊢ γf
E*
D,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
...
Proof ⋆
H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
W
H2O,H2O,E,D ⊢ γf
E*
D,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
W
D,H2O,H2O,E,H2O ⊢ γf
E*
D,H2O,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
Finally, we proveD,E,H2O,H2O,H2O ⊢ γa. The proof also uses Proof ⋆.
...
Proof ⋆
H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γf
ax
H2O ⊢ H2O
ax
∼T ⊢ ∼T
⊸L
H2O⊸ ∼T,H2O ⊢ ∼T
⊗R
H2O,H2O,E,H2O⊸ ∼T,H2O ⊢ γf ⊗∼T
definition
H2O,H2O,E,D,H2O ⊢ γa
E*
D,H2O,H2O,H2O,E ⊢ γa
Dichotomous preferences: eliminations of bad equilibria. If the preferences are dichotomous, there
are plenty Nash equilibria in Gǫaf . They are: (∅, ∅), (∅, {H2O}), (∅, {H2O,H2O}), ({D}, ∅), ({D},
{H2O}), ({D}, {H2O,H2O}), ({E}, {H2O,H2O}), ({D,E}, {H2O,H2O}), and ({D,E},
{H2O,H2O,H2O}).
However, only the profile ({D,E}, {H2O,H2O,H2O}), whose outcome is {D,H2O,H2O,H2O,
E}, satisfies the objectives of both players. It would thus be desirable to eliminate the other profiles. To
do so, let ǫ′ be the endowment such that ǫ′a = {D,E,H2O,H2O,H2O} and ǫ
′
f = ∅. The gameG
ǫ′
af and
the realized objectives can be (partially) depicted as on Figure 7.
It is readily seen that in Gǫ
′
af , when preferences are dichotomous, only the profile
({D,E,H2O,H2O,H2O}, ∅) whose outcome is {D,H2O,H2O,H2O,E}, is a Nash equilibrium.
Parsimonious preferences: construction of a good equilibrium. If the preferences are parsimonious,
the profile (∅, ∅) is a Nash equilibrium, and is the only one. One can nonetheless redistribute the resources
so as to construct an equilibrium where Alan and the fish both realize their objectives. That is, one
can construct the profile ({D,E}, {H2O,H2O,H2O}). To do so, let ǫ′′ be the endowment such that
ǫ′′a = {D,H2O,H2O,H2O} and ǫ
′′
f = {E}. The game G
ǫ′′
af and the realized objectives can be depicted
as on Figure 8.
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a
f ∅
∅ ∅
{D} {D}
...
...
{E,H2O,H2O} {E,H2O,H2O} : γf
...
...
{E,H2O,H2O,H2O} {E,H2O,H2O,H2O} : γf
...
...
{D,E,H2O,H2O} {D,E,H2O,H2O} : γf
{D,E,H2O,H2O,H2O} {D,E,H2O,H2O,H2O} : γa, γf
Figure 7: The gameGǫ
′
af .
When preferences are parsimonious, the profiles (∅, ∅) and ({D,H2O,H2O,H2O}, {E}) are Nash
equilibria in Gǫ
′
af and are the only ones.
Notice that, the redistribution ǫ′ would also effectively construct the profile ({D,H2O,H2O,H2O},
{E}). At the price of a more draconian redistribution, it would also eliminate (∅, ∅).
6.2 Ann and Bernard get a divorce
We formalize Example 1. We will only consider parsimonious preferences. We also assume that LOG is
Affine MLL. We introduce the resources involved in the example.
• the alarm clock: aclock
• the resource of flour for a year: flour
• the resource of one year worth of bread: bread
• the breadmaker is the resource transformation process: flour⊸ bread
Using these as basic resources, we formalize Example 1 as the gameGǫab .
Game definition. Let Gǫab = ({a, b}, γa, γb, ǫa, ǫb) be the individual resource game with two players,
Ann a and Bernard b. Ann wants enough bread for a year: γa = bread. Bernard wants the alarm clock:
γb = aclock. In the gameG
ǫ
ab , Ann is endowed with the alarm clock: ǫa = {aclock}. Bernard is endowed
with enough flour to make bread for two years, and with the breadmaker: ǫb = {flour, flour, breadmaker}.
The game Gǫab and the realized objectives can be depicted as on Figure 9. (For the convenience
representation, Bernard plays rows, and Ann plays columns.)
Formal proofs of the realized objectives. All the formal proofs of the realized objectives are trivial.
The proof that aclock ⊢ γb indicating that Bernard can realize his objective with the only resource of an
alarm clock is simply:
ax
aclock ⊢ aclock
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a
f ∅ {E}
∅ ∅ {E}
{H2O} {H2O} {H2O,E}
{H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O,E} : γf
{H2O,H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O,H2O} {H2O,H2O,H2O,E} : γf
{D} {D} {D,E}
{D,H2O} {D,H2O} {D,H2O,E}
{D,H2O,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O,E} : γf
{D,H2O,H2O,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O,H2O} {D,H2O,H2O,H2O,E} : γa, γf
Figure 8: The gameGǫ
′′
af .
b
a ∅ {aclock}
∅ ∅ {aclock} : γb
{flour} {flour} {flour, aclock} : γb
{flour⊸ bread} {flour⊸ bread} {flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb
{flour, flour} {flour, flour} {flour, flour, aclock} : γb
{flour, flour⊸ bread} {flour, flour⊸ bread} : γa {flour, flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb, γa
{flour, flour, flour⊸ bread} {flour, flour, flour⊸ bread} : γa {flour, flour, flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb, γa
Figure 9: The game Gǫab . The profile (∅, ∅) is the only Nash equilibrium in presence of parsimonious
preferences.
The proof that Ann can realize her objective with resources of enough flour for a year and a breadmaker,
viz., that flour, flour⊸ bread ⊢ γa, is also very simple.
ax
flour ⊢ flour
ax
bread ⊢ bread
⊸L
flour, flour⊸ bread ⊢ bread
These two elementary proofs can easily be extended to a proof for every other realized objective by using
the weakening rule (W ).
An undesirable equilibrium. One can see on Figure 9, that the profiles ({flour, flour ⊸ bread},
{aclock}) and ({flour, flour, flour⊸ bread}, {aclock}) in chb×cha would satisfy both Ann and Bernard.
However, in both them, Bernard has an incentive to provide less resources from his endowment, and to
deviate to ∅ ∈ chb. In turn, in (∅, {aclock}) ∈ chb × cha, Ann is not satisfied, and so has an incentive
to retain her resources as well, deviating to her choice ∅ ∈ cha. The profiles ({flour, flour⊸ bread}, ∅)
and ({flour, flour, flour⊸ bread}, ∅}) in chb × cha satisfy Ann’s objective but do not satisfy Bernard’s.
Hence, Bernard has an incentive to deviate to ∅ ∈ chb.
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The profile (∅, ∅) is the only Nash equilibrium of Gǫab , but it satisfy neither Ann’s objective, nor
Bernard’s. On the other hand, the outcome of the profile ({flour, flour⊸ bread}, {aclock}) ∈ chb× cha
would satisfy them both.
A desirable redistribution. So the arbitrator redistributes the resources that are available. He assigns
the breadmaker and half the flour to Ann. He assigns the alarm clock and half the flour to Bernard. That
is, ǫ′a = {flour, flour⊸ bread} and ǫ
′
b = {flour, aclock}. This redistribution yields the gameG
ǫ
ab . It can
be depicted as on Figure 10. (As precedently, Bernard plays rows, and Ann plays columns.) In Gǫab , the
b
a ∅ {flour} {flour⊸ bread} {flour, flour⊸ bread}
∅ ∅ {flour} {flour⊸ bread} {flour, flour⊸ bread} : γa
{flour} {flour} {flour, flour} {flour, flour⊸ bread} : γa {flour, flour, flour⊸ bread} : γa
{aclock} {aclock} : γb {flour, aclock} : γb {flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb {flour, flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb, γa
{flour, aclock} {flour, aclock} : γb {flour, flour, aclock} : γb {flour, flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb, γa {flour, flour, flour⊸ bread, aclock} : γb, γa
Figure 10: The gameGǫ
′
ab . The profile ({aclock}, {flour, flour⊸ bread}) ∈ chb × cha is the only Nash
equilibrium in presence of parsimonious preferences.
profile (∅, ∅) is not a Nash equilibrium, and so has been eliminated. Indeed, it does not satisfy Bernard,
and he has an incentive to deviate to the profile ({aclock}, ∅) ∈ chb × cha in which his objective is
satisfied. But ({aclock}, ∅) is not a Nash equilibrium either. Indeed, it does not satisfy Ann, and she has
an incentive to deviate to the profile ({aclock}, {flour, flour⊸ bread}) ∈ chb× cha. From here, nobody
has an incentive to deviate, and it is a Nash equilibrium. It is in fact the only Nash equilibrium in Gǫab .
One can readily see that the profile ({flour, aclock}, {flour, flour ⊸ bread}) ∈ chb × cha, even
though it satisfies both Ann and Bernard, is not a Nash equilibrium. Bernard has an incentive to provide
less resources. The same can be said about the profile ({flour, aclock}, {flour⊸ bread}) ∈ chb × cha.
7 Cooperative resources games with individual goals
We have used the individual resource games as models of strategic individual games. The players have to
seek after resource objectives and compete for those resources. When unable to reach a resource alone,
they might have to form coalitions. (See, e.g., [17].) In this section, we show how IRGs can also be used
as models of cooperative games.
In their abstract definition, coalitional games are presented as a tuple (N, v), where N is a set of
agents, and v : 2N −→ R is a coalition collective payoff, or valuation function. Typically, we assume
that v(∅) = 0. We call simple game a coalitional game such that for every coalition C ⊆ N , we have
v(C) = 0 or v(C) = 1. Where these utilities come from however is not part of the description. Here
we build our models of coalitional games on top of the individual resource games. Each player i of a
game is endowed with a multiset of resources ǫi. An action for Player i consists in contributing a subset
of ǫi. Then, each player i has a goal γi, which is a resource, represented by one formula of LOG. In the
resulting coalition games, the valuation function will depend of these individual endowments and goals.
Analogous models can be found in [31] and [3].
A coalitionC is a subset ofN . We denote the goal of coalitionC with themultiset γC = {γi | i ∈ C}.
We denote the endowment of coalition C with ǫC =
⊎
i∈C ǫi.
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We say a coalition of agents C = {c1, . . . , cp}, with ci 6= cj for every i 6= j, can perform a multiset
of resources P ⊆ LOG if7
∃E1 ⊆ ǫc1 , . . . , ∃Ep ⊆ ǫcp
such that8
E1, . . . , Ep ⊢
⊗
P .
When it is the case, we write canperform(C,P). We then denote the set of multisets of individual goals a
coalition C can perform
Γ(C) = {Γ ⊆ γC | canperform(C,Γ)} .
We state a few properties of the predicate canperform.
Proposition 36. The following properties hold:
1. If C1 ⊆ C2 and canperform(C1,P) then canperform(C2,P).
2. IfC1∩C2 = ∅, canperform(C1,P1), and canperform(C2,P2) then canperform(C1∪C2,P1⊎P2).
3. If LOG is affine, C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, canperform(C1,P1), and canperform(C2,P2) then
canperform(C1 ∪ C2,P1 ∪ P2).
Proof. We prove each item:
Proof of (1). Let C1 = {c1, . . . , cp} and C2 = C1 ∪ {cp+1, . . . , cq}. Suppose canperform(C1,P).
So, ∃E1 ⊆ ǫc1 . . .∃Ep ⊆ ǫcp such that E1, . . . , Ep ⊢
⊗
P. Also, E1, . . . , Ep, ∅, . . . , ∅ ⊢
⊗
P. So,
∃E1 ⊆ ǫc1 . . . ∃Eq ⊆ ǫcq such that E1, . . . , Eq ⊢
⊗
P, and we conclude.
Proof of (2). Let C1 = {c1, . . . , cp} and C2 = {cp+1, . . . , cq}. The fact canperform(C1,P1)
implies ∃E1 ⊆ ǫc1 . . .∃Ep ⊆ ǫcp such that E1, . . . , Ep ⊢
⊗
P1. The fact canperform(C2,P2) implies
∃Ep+1 ⊆ ǫcp+1 . . .∃Eq ⊆ ǫcq such that Ep+1, . . . , Eq ⊢
⊗
P2.
So, ∃E1 ⊆ ǫc1 . . . Eq ⊆ ǫcq such that: E1, . . . , Ep ⊢
⊗
P1 and Ep+1, . . . , Eq ⊢
⊗
P2. With,
⊗R, we thus obtain E1, . . . , Ep, Ep+1, . . . , Eq ⊢
⊗
P1 ⊗
⊗
P2, which is equivalent to E1, . . . , Eq ⊢⊗
(P1 ⊎ P2)
Now suppose that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. So all players from c1 through cq are unique, and we can conclude.
Proof of (3). Starting with the same premises as the ones for the proof of (2), we obtain that ∃E1 ⊆
ǫc1 . . . Eq ⊆ ǫcq such that E1, . . . , Eq ⊢
⊗
(P1 ⊎ P2). Since LOG is affine, we can show that E1, . . . ,
Eq ⊢
⊗
(P1 ∪ P2). It immediately follows from two simple facts: (i) P1 ∪ P2 ⊆ P1 ⊎ P2, and (ii) for
every three multisets of formulas X,Y,Γ: if X ⊆ Y , Γ ⊢
⊗
Y , and LOG is affine, then Γ ⊢
⊗
X .
(i) is trivial. (ii) is rather banal to a reader familiar with formal proofs: take X = {A1, . . . , AkX } and
Y = {A1, . . . , AkY }with kY > kX . We start from the axiom (rule (ax))A1⊗. . .⊗AkX ⊢ A1⊗. . .⊗AkX
and, with every formulas Ai, kX < i ≤ kY , successively apply (W) to add Ai to the left part of the
sequent, and apply⊗L. We obtainA1⊗ . . .⊗AkX ⊗ . . .⊗AkY ⊢ A1⊗ . . .⊗AkX . That is
⊗
Y ⊢
⊗
X .
Together with Γ ⊢
⊗
Y , we conclude that Γ ⊢
⊗
X by applying (cut).
Remark 37. Notice that in general, if LOG is linear, Prop. 36.3 does not hold. To see this, consider
the IRG ({1, 2}, γ1 = D, γ2 = D, ǫ1 = {A ⊗ B}, ǫ2 = {A ⊗ C}), and assume that A is not a
vacuous resource (that is, not provably equivalent to the constant 1). We have canperform({1}, {A,B})
and canperform({2}, {A,C}), but we don’t have canperform({1, 2}, {A,B,C}). Indeed, to obtain the
resources B and C, both agents need to play their full endowment. But then, we will be left with an extra
A that we cannot dispose of.
We first give a general definition of our coalitional games where the valuation function of the coali-
tions is kept abstract.
7A formula of LOG can occur more than once in P; the multiplicity of a formula in ǫi cannot exceed its multiplicity in Ei.
8
⊗
{e1, . . . , en} = e1 ⊗ . . .⊗ en, with the convention
⊗
∅ = 1—the neutral element for ⊗.
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Definition 38. An Individual Goal Coalition Resource Game (IGCRG) is a tuple (G, v) where:
• G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) is an individual resource game;
• v : 2N −→ R is a coalition valuation function.
The function v assigns a utility to every coalition. In the remainder, we exemplify IGCRGs with two
instantiations of v. In Section 7.1, we present a model of simple games where a coalition has utility 1
when its members can act together and achieve all their individual goals. In Section 7.2, we present a
model where the value of a coalition is the maximal number of its members’ goals it can satisfy by acting
together.
7.1 All Individual Goal Coalition Resource Games
We define a first concrete instantiation of IGCRG. The following class of models is equivalent to one-goal
Rich Coalitional Resource Games introduced in [27].
Definition 39. An All Individual Goal Coalition Resource Game (AIGCRG) is a tuple (G, v) where:
• G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) is an individual resource game;
• For every coalition C ⊆ N \ {∅}, v(C) = 1 if canperform(C, γC) and v(C) = 0 otherwise. Also,
v(∅) = 0.
An AIGCRG is thus a simple game. A coalition C is winning when it can perform γC , that is, all the
individual goals of its members simultaneously. The coalition is losing otherwise.
We illustrate AIGCRG with a very simple example.
Example 40. Let (G, v) be the AIGCRG where G = ({1, 2, 3}, γ1 = A, γ2 = A ⊗ A, γ3 = A, ǫ1 =
{A}, ǫ2 = {A}, ǫ3 = {A,A}). We have:
C ⊆ {1, 2, 3} v(C)
∅ 0
{1} 1
{2} 0
{3} 1
{1, 2} 0
{1, 3} 1
{2, 3} 1
{1, 2, 3} 1
It is indeed a simple example, and it admits simple proofs involving only the rules (ax) and (⊗R). We see
that v({2, 3}) = 1. So {2, 3} is a winning coalition. To see it, take E2 = ǫ1 = {A}, and E3 = ǫ3 =
{A,A}. We can prove that E2, E3 ⊢ γ2 ⊗ γ3, as follows:
ax
A ⊢ A
ax
A ⊢ A ⊗R
A,A ⊢ A⊗A
ax
A ⊢ A
⊗R
A,A,A ⊢ (A⊗A)⊗A
Remark 41. AIGCRGs are in general neither monotonic nor superadditive. The former is rather unusual.
The latter is particularly expected for a class of simple games. In general, AIGCRGs are not monotonic.
In Example 40 we can see that v({1}) = 1, but v({1, 2}) = 0. In general, AIGCRGs are not superaddi-
tive. In Example 40 we can see that v({1}) = 1 and v({3}) = 1, but v({1, 3}) = 1 < v({1}) + v({3}).
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As mentioned, AIGCRGs are equivalent to one-goal Rich Coalitional Resource Games (one-goal
RCRGs) studied in [27]; the following example is adapted from there.
Example 42. Player 1 is happy with bacon, Player 2 is happy with either bacon or an egg, and Player 3
is happy with an omelet. Player 1 is endowed with one egg and the capacity of using an egg to make an
omelet. Player 2 is endowed with bacon. Player 3 is endowed with one egg.
Formally, b stands for bacon, e for one egg, and o for an omelet. Player 1 is happy with b, Player 2 is
happy with either b or e and does care about choosing (i.e., b⊕e), and Player 3 is happy with o. Player 1
is endowed with one token of e and the consumable capacity of transforming an e into an o (i.e., e⊸ o).
Player 2 is endowed with one token of b. Player 3 is endowed with one token of e. To formalise it, let
(G, v) be the the AIGCRG where G = (N, γ1, γ2γ3, ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3), where:
• N = {1, 2, 3}
• γ1 = b γ2 = b⊕ e γ3 = o
• ǫ1 = {e, e⊸ o} ǫ2 = {b} ǫ3 = {e}
Clearly, Player 3 needs Player 1 to be happy. Player 1 needs Player 2 to be happy. Player 2 can rely on
herself by using her endowed b. However, if she forms a winning coalition with Player 1, this b must be
used towards the happiness of Player 1. In this case, it is Player 1’s endowed e that will be used towards
Player 2’s happiness. To add Player 3 into the winning coalition, Player 3 can provide his endowed e,
which can be transformed into an o using Player 1’s capacity e⊸ o.
The winning coalitions are {2}, {1, 2}, and {1, 2, 3}. The coalition {2} is winning because b ⊢ b⊕ e
and {b} ⊆ ǫ2. The coalition {1, 2} is winning because e, b ⊢ b ⊗ (b ⊕ e), {e} ⊆ ǫ1, and {b} ⊆ ǫ2.
We show in more details that {1, 2, 3} is a winning coalition, and that they can win by using all their
endowed resources.
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 ⊢ b⊗ (b⊕ e)⊗ o .
ax
b ⊢ b
ax
e ⊢ e ⊕R
e ⊢ b⊕ e
ax
e ⊢ e
ax
o ⊢ o
⊸L
e⊸ o, e ⊢ o
⊗R
e, e⊸ o, e ⊢ (b⊕ e)⊗ o
⊗R
b, e, e⊸ o, e ⊢ b⊗ (b⊕ e)⊗ o
def
ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 ⊢ b⊗ (b⊕ e)⊗ o
A player is a veto player when there is no winning coalition without the player’s contribution. Since
we have identified all the winning coalitions in (G, v), we can easily determine the veto players. Player 2
is the only veto player of the game. Player 1 and Player 3 are not, as witnessed by {2} being a winning
coalition.
A player is a dummy player when its presence or absence in a coalition does not change the value;
it has neither a positive nor a negative impact. Player 3 is the only dummy player of the game (G, v).
Player 1 is not a dummy because v({1, 2, 3}) = 1 and v({2, 3}) = 0. Player 2 is not a dummy because
v(∅) = 0 and v({2}) = 1.
A payoff vector is a (real-valued) distribution of the value of the grand coalition, that is v(N) =
v({1, 2, 3}) = 1, here. A payoff vector is stable, in the core, when no coalition could get more that it gets.
Let p = (0, 1, 0) be a payoff vector. Since Player 2 is a veto player it is in the core of the game. It is the
only one, because Player 2 is the only veto player.
7.2 Max Number Individual Goal Coalition Resource Games
Definition 38 leaves space to more and richer specializations, which enjoy some properties that AIGCRGs
do not.
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Definition 43. A Max Number Individual Goal Coalition Resource Game (MNIGCRG) is a tuple (G, v)
where:
• G = (N, γ1, . . . , γn, ǫ1, . . . , ǫn) is an individual resource game;
• For every coalition C ⊆ N , v(C) = maxΓ∈Γ(C) |Γ|.
We illustrate MNIGCRG with a very simple example.
Example 44. Let (G, v) be the MNIGCRG where G = ({1, 2, 3}, γ1 = A, γ2 = A ⊗ A, γ3 = A, ǫ1 =
{A}, ǫ2 = {A}, ǫ3 = {A,A}). We have:
C ⊆ {1, 2, 3} v(C)
∅ 0
{1} 1
{2} 0
{3} 1
{1, 2} 1
{1, 3} 2
{2, 3} 2
{1, 2, 3} 3
MNIGCRGs are monotonic games.
Proposition 45. If C1 ⊆ C2 then v(C1) ≤ v(C2).
Proof. Suppose C1 ⊆ C2. By Prop. 36.1, we have that whenever canperform(C1,Γ), we also have
canperform(C2,Γ). This means that Γ(C1) ⊆ Γ(C2). ThusmaxΓ∈Γ(C1) |Γ| ≤ maxΓ∈Γ(C2) |Γ|, and we
can conclude.
MNIGCRGs are superadditive games.
Proposition 46. If C1 ∩ C2 then v(C1) + v(C2) ≤ v(C1 ∪ C2)).
Proof. By definition of MNIGCRG, there is Γ1 ⊆ γC1 such that canperform(C1,Γ1) and |Γ1| = v(C1).
Similarly, there is Γ2 ⊆ γC1 such that canperform(C2,Γ2) and |Γ2| = v(C2). Now suppose C1 ∩ C2.
By Prop. 36.2, we know that canperform(C1 ∪ C2,Γ1 ⊎ Γ2). Clearly |Γ1 ⊎ Γ2| = |Γ1| + |Γ2|, and, by
definition of MNIGCRG, v(C1 ∪ C2) ≥ |Γ1 ⊎ Γ2|. Thus, we have v(C1 ∪ C2) ≥ v(C1) + v(C2).
Still, there are properties that MNIGCRGs do not enjoy.
Remark 47. MNIGCRGs are not subadditive (and thus not additive, and not submodular): In Exam-
ple 44, v({1, 3}) + v({2}) < v({1, 2, 3}). They are not supermodular: In Example 44, v({1, 3}) +
v({2, 3}) 6= v({1, 2, 3}) + v({2}).
8 Conclusions
We presented a class of games of resources that exploits the formalisms and reasoning methods for
resource-sensitive logics. The language of Linear Logic allows us to represent in an harmonious way
simultaneous resources, deterministic and non-deterministic choice, and crucially, resource-transforming
capacities. A resource is a formula of Linear Logic.
In individual resource games, each player of a game is endowed with a multiset of resources and has
an objective represented by a resource. In this context, we studied studied three decision problems, the
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Table 4: Complexity results when the problem of validity checking in LOG is in NP.
first of which is to decide whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium. Some profiles that are not equilibria
can have desirable outcomes from the point of view of an external authority. Some equilibria can have
outcomes that are undesirable. We thus studied redistribution schemes which can be used by a central
authority to enforce some behavior, either by disincentivizing a behavior or incentivizing a behavior.
This yielded two related decision problems: rational elimination and rational construction of profiles. We
illustrated the models and the decision problems with two examples.
We considered dichotomous or parsimonious preferences, and showed striking algorithmic differ-
ences when the logic employed admits or not the weakening rule.
Summary of complexity results. For all decision problems, for both types of preferences, we have
studied four cases where proof-search in LOG can have the following properties: affine vs. linear, and
NP-complete vs. PSPACE-complete.
When LOG isNP-complete, we sum up precisely the results in Figure 4. For instance, one can quickly
gather that when LOG is Affine MLL (whose sequent validity checking is NP-complete) and we consider
parsimonious preferences,RATIONAL ELIMINATION is in PNP||. We proved the same problem to be in
Σ
p
2 when LOG is Linear MLL. It is interesting to note that, although weakening usually does not change
the complexity of the problem of sequent validity checking of the logics we considered,9 one have always
been able to capitalize on its presence to simplify our solutions to the problems we studied here.
Putting the results of this paper together, it is also easy to see that we have this theorem.
Theorem 48. When LOG is PSPACE-complete, linear or affine, with dichotomous or with parsimonious
preferences, all three decision problems are PSPACE-complete.
9We did not consider full propositional Linear Logic, which also contains so-called ‘exponentials’. Weakening does make
a difference: sequent validity in full propositional Linear Logic is undecidable [14], while sequent validity in full propositional
Affine Logic is decidable [12].
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First-Order MLL is one of these logics whose complexity of sequent validity is in NP. On the other
hand, sequent validity for First-Order MALL is NEXPTIME-complete. It is routine to adapt our proofs
to show this theorem.
Theorem 49. When LOG is First-Order MALL, linear or affine, with dichotomous or with parsimonious
preferences, all three decision problems are NEXPTIME-complete.
Comparison with the related literature. Electric Boolean Games [9] are an extension of Boolean
games where playing a certain action has a numeric cost, and agents are endowed with a certain amount
of ‘energy’. Deciding whether a profile is a Nash equilibrium in a Boolean game is coNP-complete [4].
In Electric Boolean Games, deciding whether a profile is rationally eliminable is NP-complete, while
deciding whether a profile is rationally constructible is coNP-hard and in∆
p
2.
The trend is that the complexity of decision problems in individual resource games is higher than for
their counterparts in Electric Boolean Games. An obvious exception is the problem to decide whether an
individual resource game admits a Nash equilibrium when LOG is affine and we consider dichotomous
preferences. The problem is trivial by Prop. 12, while it is Σ
p
2-complete in Boolean games [4].
In Boolean games, goals of players are expressed as classical propositional formulas. Moreover, game
outcomes or profiles are in fact models of classical propositional logic, i.e., valuations. Checking whether
the goal of a player is satisfied in a game profile is an easy problem in Boolean games. This is also true in
Electric Boolean Games. In contrast in resource games, checking whether the goal of a player is satisfied
in a game profile is as hard as proof search in LOG.
In individual resource games, there is no one-to-one correspondence between profiles and outcomes.
This is another difference with Electric Boolean Game. As a consequence, the notions of elimination and
construction in individual resource games add a bit of complexity by having to consider a set of profiles
with the same outcomes.
With the decision problems of rational elimination and rational construction, there is a dimension of
social choice theory and mechanism design. Formal frameworks concerned with redistribution schemes
and economic policies can be found for instance in [9] again, or [6, 13, 15].
Finally, we mostly focused on individual games and looked at Nash equilibria. Nonetheless, the
setting allows one to easily build classes of coalition games, as we have shown in Section 7. These
classes of games are reminiscent of Coalitional Resource Games [31, 5] and of Coalition Skill Games [2].
In [27], we have started their study, with what we called Rich Coalitional Resource Games (RCRGs). All
Individual Goal Coalition Resource Games, introduced in Section 7.1, correspond to one-goal RCRGs.
Moreover, RCRGs are effectively an extension of Coalitional Resource Games.
Perspectives. We have obtained tight complexity results when LOG is PSPACE-complete. However,
this is lacking when LOG is in NP. We suspect that the complexity of the diverse decision problems
generally lie above the lower bounds we have obtained. It is more likely that some proposed upper
bounds are tight. One perspective will thus be to investigate whether some decision problems could be
proven hard for some complexity class in the polynomial or Boolean hierarchy, for instance using the
techniques from [29] of raising NP lower bounds to lower bounds for classes above NP.
Resource games based on resource-sensitive logics become all the more significant when the resources
are subject to transforming activities. We can exploit the existing research on these resource-sensitive
logics about their proof theory. In particular, through the Curry-Howard correspondence between proofs
and programs (see, e.g., [7]), an exciting perspective is the possibility to interpret the logical proofs as
rigorous programs to be executed by the players. We can expect to obtain some results for the automated
generation of plans, where the resources can be subjected to a series of transforming activities by the
agents.
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Moving from the models of resource games presented here, we have started to investigate a more
amenable class of games, where each player i is also assigned a set of “skills” in the shape of k formulas
of the form A ⊸ B. The idea is that Player i has k actions, and can contribute B if they can first
transform some of their resource endowment into A.
Finally, we intend to pursue the work on cooperative resource games introduced in Section 7, with
some advances already presented in [27].
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A Sequent rules of Affine MALL
We present the sequent rules for Affine MALL. In what follows, A, B, A0, and A1 are formulas. Γ, Γ
′,
∆, and ∆′ are sequences of zero or more formulas. A sequent rule has an upper and a lower part. The
upper part is composed of zero, one, or two sequents. The lower part is composed of one sequent. If there
is a proof of all the sequents of the upper part, then the rule can be used to obtain a proof of the sequent
of the lower part.
Identities
ax
A ⊢ A
Γ, A ⊢ ∆ Γ′ ⊢ A,∆′
cut
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ ∆,∆′
Structural Rules
Γ, A,B,Γ′ ⊢ ∆
E
Γ, B,A,Γ′ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆, A,B,∆′
E
Γ ⊢ ∆, B,A,∆′
Γ ⊢ ∆
W
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
W
Γ ⊢ ∆, A
Negation
Γ ⊢ A,∆
L∼
Γ,∼A ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
R∼
Γ ⊢ ∼A,∆
Multiplicatives
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ′ ⊢ B,∆′
⊗R
Γ,Γ′ ⊢ A⊗B,∆,∆′
Γ, A,B ⊢ ∆
⊗L
Γ, A⊗B ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆ Γ′, B ⊢ ∆′
`L
Γ,Γ′, A`B ⊢ ∆,∆′
Γ ⊢ A,B,∆
`R
Γ ⊢ A` B,∆
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ′, B ⊢ ∆′
⊸L
Γ,Γ′, A⊸ B,∆ ⊢ ∆′
Γ, A ⊢ B,∆
⊸R
Γ ⊢ A⊸ B,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
1L
Γ,1 ⊢ ∆
1R
⊢ 1
⊥L
⊥ ⊢
Γ ⊢ ∆
⊥R
Γ ⊢ ∆,⊥
Additives (In ⊕R, and &L, i stands for either 0 or 1.)
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ ⊢ B,∆
&R
Γ ⊢ A&B,∆
Γ, Ai ⊢ ∆
&L
Γ, A0 &A1 ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆ Γ, B ⊢ ∆
⊕L
Γ, A⊕B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ Ai,∆
⊕R
Γ ⊢ A0 ⊕A1,∆
⊤R
Γ ⊢ ⊤,∆
0L
Γ,0 ⊢ ∆
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B Elements of computational complexity
We need to assume some familiarity with computational complexity. This appendix only introduces the
some elements of terminology and some definitions about complexity theory. The reader familiar with
these notions can use this section for quick reference. Another reader can use it as a starting point and
move to a more complete introduction. A classic introduction to computational complexity is [19]. All
elementary complexity classes used in this paper are presented in [24].
A decision problem (or problem for short) is a problem that is posed as ‘yes’/‘no’ question of the
values of the input.
The class P is the class of decision problems that can be solved in deterministic polynomial time
(wrt. the size of the input). The class NP is the class of problems that can be solved in non-deterministic
polynomial time. The class PSPACE is the class of problems that can be solved using a polynomial
amount of space. The complement of a decision problem is the decision problem resulting from reversing
the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers. For every class of complexity C, we note coC the class populated with the
complements of the problems in C. Given two classes of complexity C1 and C2, the class C
C2
1 is the class
of problems that are in C1 if we assume the availability of an oracle to solve the problems in C2. An oracle
for C2 is a black box capable to solve every problem in C2 in a single operation. Queries to an oracle
can be adaptive (also called serial), or non-adaptive (also called parallel). A query is adaptive when it
depends on the answer of a previous query. Non-adaptive queries on the other hand, can be chosen in
advance and computed from the start and are asked in parallel.
For every class of complexity C, we note PC (resp. NPC) the class of problems solvable on a deter-
ministic (resp. non-deterministic) polynomial-time bounded oracle Turing machine using an oracle set C.
We note PC[k] and NPC[k] when at most k adaptive queries to C can be used. We note PC||[k] and NPC||[k]
when at most k non-adaptive queries to C can be used.
We note PC|| (resp. NPC||) the class of problems solvable on a deterministic (resp. non-deterministic)
polynomial-time bounded oracle Turing machine with non-adaptive queries to C. The class PNP|| is also
referred to as Θ
p
2.
The polynomial hierarchy. The polynomial hierarchy contains a family of complexity classes that are
smaller than PSPACE. The class P lies at the bottom of the polynomial hierarchy. Then, for every positive
integer i, we can define∆
p
i , Σ
p
i , and Π
p
i recursively as follows:
• ∆p0 = Σ
p
0 = Π
p
0 = P;
• ∆pi+1 = P
Σ
p
i ;
• Σpi+1 = NP
Σ
p
i ;
• Πpi = coΣ
p
i .
The Boolean hierarchy overNP. The Boolean hierarchy has been studied in [30, 11, 29]. The Boolean
hierarchy over NP contains a family of complexity classes that are smaller than ∆
p
2. The class NP lies
at the bottom of the Boolean hierarchy over NP. Here, we are better off looking at complexity classes
not as classes of decision problems, but as classes of languages. A language is the formal realization of
a decision problem. Let p be a decision problem with k inputs. A language of p is the language Lp =
{(a1, . . . , ak) | p answers ‘yes’ of the input (a1, . . . , ak)}. Given a class of complexity C, we say that
Lp ∈ C iff p ∈ C. Then, given two classes of complexity C1 and C2, each representing a set of languages
and the decision problems they formalize, we define C1 ∧ C2 = {L1 ∩ L2 | L1 ∈ C1 and L2 ∈ C2} and
C1 ∨ C2 = {L1 ∪L2 | L1 ∈ C1 and L2 ∈ C2}. In this context, the class NP is the class of languages that
can be recognised in non-deterministic polynomial time. Then, for every positive integer i, we can define
BHi recursively as follows:
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• BH0 = NP;
• BH2k = coNP ∧ BH2k−1;
• BH2k+1 = NP ∨ BH2k.
The class BH2 = NP ∧ coNP is the “difference class” DP presented in [18].
Useful properties. Besides the definitions, the following properties are useful:
• CcoC21 = C
C2
1 (for all two classes C1 and C2);
• NPΣ
p
i = Σpi+1;
• coΣpi = Π
p
i ;
• NP∆
p
i = Σpi ;
• P∆
p
i = ∆pi ;
• Σpi ⊆ PSPACE;
• PSPACE = coPSPACE = PPSPACE = NPPSPACE;
• BHi ⊆ ∆
p
2;
• PNP||[k] ⊆ BHk+1 ⊆ PNP||[k+1].
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